Prior to 2014, the admission to Master's and PhD programs in psychology in Israel was a mostly decentralized process. In 2013, in response to concerns about the existing procedure, we proposed to use a mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof for applicants. The first part of this paper describes how we successfully centralized this market, and the critical role of recent advances in the theory of matching with contracts. In the second part of the paper we show empirically (using clearinghouse data) and theoretically that the regularity in preferences with respect to contractual terms leads to a large core. Our results stand in sharp contrast to findings of previous studies on two-sided matching markets without contracts [2, 10, 11, 13] .
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The data from the IPMM suggests that relatively many applicants receive different contracts under different stable matchings. A similar phenomenon is observed in data from the Hungarian college admissions process. This process is a one-sided matching-with-contracts market that is a governed by a variant of the applicant-proposing DA, where applicants rank study programs and financial terms. We find that a substantial fraction of the approximately 100,000 applicants who participate in this match every year were part of multiple stable matchings, and, moreover, that different stable matchings have a different number of assigned applicants.
We modify the models of Immorlica and Mahdian [10] and Kojima and Pathak [11] to capture the features of participants' preferences in the IPMM and the Hungarian market. In particular, we incorporate the fact that applicants like to be funded, but that for many applicants funding is of secondary importance relative to the program they will be assigned to. We find that the core is large, and that in the many-to-one version a the number of assigned applicants significantly varies between stable matchings.
